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In re the Matter of)	No. 4072-F-109
RICHARD B. SANDERS, Justice, Washington Supreme Court)))	CORRECTED AMENDED
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This matter came on for a fact-finding hearing before the Commission on Judicial Conduct sitting in Kent, Washington on December 6 - 10, 2004. The Commission members participating as the fact-finding panel for this matter were Wanda Briggs; Harold D. Clarke, III; Marianne Connelly; Antonio P. Cube; Judie Fortier; Joel Penoyar; John A. Schultheis; Mike Sotelo; Josephine Townsend; Betsy Wilkerson; and Gregory R. Dallaire, Presiding Officer.

Katrina C. Pflaumer of Seattle appeared as Disciplinary Counsel. Respondent was present and represented by Kurt M. Bulmer.

The Commission heard and considered the testimony of witnesses, the stipulation of the parties regarding admissions, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and the briefs and arguments of counsel.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter commenced when a complaint was filed with the Commission on March 19, 2003. On May 29, 2003, the Respondent wrote a letter to the Commission in response to a news article that his tour may have prompted a complaint to the Commission.

After preliminary investigation, a confidential Statement of Allegations was sent to the Respondent on October 8, 2003. The Respondent replied on October 29, 2003. The original filing of the Statement of Charges was held pending settlement negotiations until April 5, 2004. Respondent's Answer to the Statement

of Charges was received on April 28, 2004. By an order filed June 17, 2004, in a ruling on motions brought by the Respondent, the Presiding Officer denied certain discovery requests. By an order filed August 27, 2004, in a ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the Respondent, the Commission dismissed certain affirmative defenses as a matter of law. By an order filed October 7, 2004, the Washington State Supreme Court (pro tem) denied Respondent's Request for Discretionary Review of the June 17, 2004, Order.

At the commencement of the fact-finding hearing, the Commission accepted into the record a Stipulation and Witness List filed December 6, 2004. After the fact-finding hearing, the Commission's Decision was filed on April 8, 2005. Thereafter, Disciplinary Counsel and Respondent's Counsel filed various motions, responses and replies related thereto. The Commission amended its decision by order dated May 27, 2005.

FINDINGS OF FACT

By letter dated December 17, 2002, the Respondent, along with the other Supreme Court Justices, was invited to visit the McNeil Island Special Commitment Center for sexually violent predators. (ex. 200) The invitation was extended on the letterhead of the African American Collective, a group of persons who were committed at the Center. A resident, Andre Brigham Young, was identified as the contact person for the Collective. (ex. 200) At the time of the letter and subsequent tour, Andre Brigham Young had a matter filed in the Washington State Supreme Court. (ex. 180) The letter requested that the Justices "evaluate and calculate" the application of RCW 79.01, et seq. through an on-site tour of the facility by conversing with the residents and staff. (ex. 200) Subsequently, the Respondent replied to Andre Brigham Young (Sanders' testimony, p. 1034) and, through his staff, initiated contact with the superintendent of the facility to make the arrangements for touring the Center. (Sanders' testimony, p. 915) January 27, 2003, was established as the date for the visit. (ex. 203) On January 8, 2003, the Respondent sent a memorandum to the other Supreme Court Justicos indicating that he had made arrangements for the visit. He requested anyone interested in attending to get back to him with certain information required by the facility for visitors. (ex. 203) The visit to the Center was discussed by the Justices en banc on January 9, 2003. (ex. 204)

At the meeting, Justice Mary Fairhurst expressed her concern about the Respondent accepting an invitation from residents of such an institution. After further discussion among the Justices, it was concluded

that her concerns could be addressed and a number of the Justices, including Justice Fairhurst and Justice Faith Ireland, expressed an interest in attending the tour. (Fairhurst testimony, pp. 66-67)

The following day, January 10, 2003, Justice Ireland wrote the superintendent of the Center (copying the Respondent and Andre Brigham Young) noting her interest in touring the Center and visiting with residents. The letter also stated the visit would not be an evaluation, but would be "informational only". (ex. 205) On January 13, 2003, Andre Brigham Young again wrote to the Respondent informing him that three members of the African American Collective, including Rickey Calhoun, would be meeting him at the main gate inside the visiting room. At the time of the letter and subsequent tour, Rickey Calhoun had a matter filed in the Washington State Supreme Court. (ex. 155) After identifying specific areas that should be toured, the letter stated as follows:

There are areas the SCC Administration would rather you didn't see. That is why we make the request of you to insist that representatives of the African American Collective be there to not only greet you upon your arrival, but also to be part of escorting you to the many different areas listed above. After all, the Collective was responsible for inviting you here, not the SCC Administration.

Attached to the letter, was the Third Quarter 2002 Report from the SCC Ombudsman. The first sentence of the report's conclusion states as follows: "SCC is further than ever from creating a constitutionally adequate facility." (ex. 206)

The January 13, 2003 letter and attachment generated further interest and concern among the Respondent's colleagues on the Supreme Court. After reviewing the letter, Justice Fairhurst wrote to the Respondent on January 21, 2003 indicating that Andre Brigham Young's letter had caused her to reconsider her decision to tour the facility. She reiterated her issue about responding to the specific request of a resident or group of residents. She also provided the Respondent with a list of published and unpublished cases brought by Andre Brigham Young in both federal and state courts on various issues. (ex. 210)

Chief Justice Alexander's testimony also reflects concern:

The red flag that went up for me is I thought that he, Andre Brigham Young, was under a misunderstanding that was not consistent with Justice Sanders' memo or Justice Ireland's email, that we were really making an official visit through the auspices of the staff there and not accepting Andre Brigham Young's invitation, and I was concerned that the misunderstanding might lead to difficulties, and so that was the red flag, if you will, that went up for me. (Transcript p. 138)

Approximately a week after seeing the January 13, 2003 letter, Justice Ireland determined that she would not participate in the tour. She informed the Respondent and warned him about the differing expectations and her concern that dialogue with the residents about their conditions of confinement would be

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We had another conversation later on about the trip and whether the trip should be made and, again, in the same sort of thing across the table from one another where I said, Richard, don't do this, and it was, you know, I was saying, making a warning statement to him, don't do this, and you know, this is a mistake, don't do this, but I think that was probably a week or so after that 13th letter. (Transcript p. 242)

Shortly thereafter, Justice Ireland bowed out of the tour in a January 22, 2003, letter to the superintendent of the Center. She noted concern about the expectations of the visit as expressed by Andre Brigham Young as well as the high volume of litigation the residents have in the Supreme Court. (ex. 211)

On January 23, 2003, the Respondent wrote the superintendent of the Center. The letter stated in part:

Please advise the residents that it is not my role to factually investigate particular legal circumstances of any individual and that discussion of same might be grounds to seek my recusal in any pending or future proceeding. That would be my only ground rule and should any discussion lead in that direction I will reiterate what I just said.

Further in the letter, the Respondent cautions:

Although I have received correspondence from some of the residents regarding the upcoming tour, that correspondence was neither solicited nor responded to, although I agree with its general tenor that the SCC is an important state institution which should be recognized and understood. If there are any particular legal problems, however, they must be dealt with fairly and impartially in the context of appropriate litigation upon which this tour shall and must have no influence whatsoever. (ex. 215)

Between the date of the invitation, December 17, 2002, and the date of the tour, January 27, 2003, a case involving sexually violent predators was in the process of being decided by the Washington State Supreme Court, In re Thorell. Thorell consolidated the appeals of Bernard Thorell, Kenneth R. Gordon, Roger C. Bishop, Gordon Michael Strauss, Charles Lee Johnson and Casper William Ross.

At the time of the visit, a dissent authored by the Respondent was being circulated for consideration by the other justices. One of the major issues in Thorell was whether a separate jury finding is required on the issue of volitional control in sexually violent predator cases. This is commonly referred to as the "volitional control" issue.

Andre Brigham Young also had an appeal filed with the Supreme Court. (ex. 180) That appeal also raised the issue of volitional control. In addition, at the times of the invitation and subsequent tour, there were several other matters filed in the Washington State Supreme Court by residents of the Center. (ex. 101) The Respondent read no cases nor made any effort to ascertain if a case was pending in the Supreme Court

before he went on the tour. (Sanders' testimony, pp. 1017-1018) Further, the Respondent did not notify counsel of the planned tour, i.e., prosecutors or defense for any of the parties who had cases filed in the Supreme Court at the time of the tour.

Sometime before the Respondent visited the facility, lawyers involved in the *Thorell* case and some of the other matters referenced above, (prosecutors in King County and the Attorney General's Office) became aware of the planned visit and communicated among themselves regarding what actions, if any, they should take. (Hackett testimony, p. 823, ex. 607) The visit took place as scheduled on January 27, 2003.

Upon his arrival at McNeil Island, the Respondent was met by Center staff. After a short motor-tour conducted by staff, the Respondent visited a recreation center where he had a brief discussion with one resident. He was then taken to a day room where he was introduced to a large group of residents. After that, the Respondent was directed into a small classroom where he initially met with six to seven residents. After he had an opportunity to engage in discourse with the initial group, other residents entered into the classroom one-by-one to replace a corresponding number of residents who exited the room. Upon leaving the classroom, the Respondent was led upstairs by staff to another dayroom where he talked with some other residents. (testimony of McLaughlin, Harris and Sanders). In total, the Respondent had individual communications with approximately 20 residents. (ex. 410; Sanders' testimony, p. 951) Four of the persons with whom the Respondent spoke (Calhoun, Johnson, Peterson, and Young), had pending cases filed in the Washington State Supreme Court at the time of the tour.

At the beginning of his discussions with the first group of residents, the Respondent warned them that he could not talk about their personal cases as that might prevent him from hearing matters in the future. (testimony of Farr, Harris, Mahoney and Sanders) Periodically, thereafter, the same caution was mentioned. (testimony of Farr, Harris, Mahoney and Sanders) Addressing the initial group of approximately six residents, the Respondent requested that each of those present tell him about their respective treatment experiences and whether they thought they had lost "volitional control" when they committed their crimes. (Sanders' testimony, pp. 948 and 1044; also Farr testimony re "controlling sexual urges" and testimony of Harris, Mahoney and McLaughlin re volitional control.)

Sometime during the tour, the Respondent accepted a "butcher paper" document from Ralph Spink, a resident of the Center. (ex. 406A, ex. 410 and McLaughlin testimony) At the time he handed the document to the Respondent, Ralph Spink had a matter filed in the Washington State Supreme Court. The list was a

compilation of twenty-nine concerns created by various residents at the Center. There were several references to treatment and statutes. (ex. 406A) The list had no attribution to a specific resident. The Respondent also accepted a manila folder containing an article regarding treatment and recidivism of sex offenders from Keith Rogers, another resident of the Center. (ex. 606; Rogers testimony)

The Respondent reviewed the first two to three items listed on the "butcher paper" document after he returned to his office in Olympia. He then placed it in a file cabinet. Without reading it, he also filed away the article contained in the manila envelope he had received from Keith Rogers. (Sanders' testimony, p. 942)

The Respondent made no effort to ascertain the names of the residents with whom he met during the tour. Sometime after the visit, the Respondent was provided with a letter from the Attorney General's Office containing a list of the names of the residents who met with him and short summaries of what was said. (ex. 402; Sanders' testimony, p. 977) The letter that accompanied the list was also sent to counsel representing the residents on the list. (Sanders' testimony, p. 979) The Respondent made no effort to determine whether the individuals on the list had cases before the Supreme Court. (Sanders' testimony, p. 977)

On or about March 18, 2003, a Motion for Recusal was filed in the case of *In re Thorell*. Citing the January visit to the Center, the Motion concluded with the following:

In order to preserve public confidence in the judicial system, Justice Sanders should no longer participate in deciding this case. (ex. 400)

On April 8, 2003, three Assistant Attorneys General, including the Chief of the Criminal Justice Division, wrote the Clerk of the Supreme Court, C.J. Merritt. The letter requested that the document given to the Respondent by Ralph Spinks and the content of the conversations on the issue of "volitional control" be disclosed and filed with the Clerk's office. (ex. 402) The Respondent gave the "butcher paper" document to the Clerk shortly thereafter. The Respondent granted the Motion for Recusal on May 12, 2003, and removed himself from any further proceedings in the case of *In re Thorell*.

ALLEGED CANON 3(A)(4) VIOLATION

On April 5, 2004, the Commission determined that probable cause existed to believe that the Respondent violated Canon 3(A) (4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct which reads as follows:

1	CANON 3				
2	Judges shall perform the duties of their office				
3	impartially and diligently.				
4	(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities.				
5					
6	(4) Judges should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or that				
7 8	person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by la neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. Judges, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested exponent on the law applicable to a proceeding before them, by amicus curiae only, if they afforced in the control of the co				
9	the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.				
10	The standard of proof required to sustain this violation is clear, cogent and convincing. The record				
11	does not meet this high standard. Although there was testimony from witnesses, including the Respondent,				
12	that he raised the issue of volitional control during the tour of the Center, the record does not establish that t				
13	responses to his general inquiry on the subject were sufficient to sustain a Canon 3(A)(4) violation.				
14	ALLEGED CANON 1 AND CANON 2 VIOLATIONS				
15	On April 5, 2004, the Commission determined that probable cause existed to believe that the				
16	Respondent violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.				
17	These Canons read as follows:				
18	CANON 1				
19	Judges shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.				
20	An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. Judges should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of judicial				
21	conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied				
22	to further that objective.				
23					
24	CANON 2				
25	Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.				
26	(A) Judges should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.				
27	(B) Judges should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence their judicial conduct or judgment. Judges should not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance				
29	the private interests of the judge or others; nor should judges convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence them. Judges should not testify voluntarily as character witnesses.				

CORRECTED AMENDED COMMISSION DECISION - 7

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There is no evidence on the record to support a violation of Canon 2(B).

The record establishes by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that before, during and after the visit to the Special Commitment Center the Respondent violated Canons 1 and 2(A). Judges are expected to exercise prudent judgment. In this case, the record is replete with evidence where the Respondent failed to meet that expectation. Those lapses have impaired the integrity and appearance of impartiality of the judiciary and, thus, give rise to the Canon violations.

The following examples illustrate this conclusion:

The letters of December 17, 2002, and January 13, 2003, put the Respondent on notice that some confusion existed about the purpose of the invitation and the expectations of the visit. It was clear that the authors of the letters wanted something akin to an investigation, rather than an informational tour. Concerns about this issue were raised by some of his colleagues on the Supreme Court. The Respondent dismissed their warnings and placed the burden of notifying the residents about the nature of his visit on the Superintendent of the institution.

The Respondent falled to make any inquiries about the people with whom he would be meeting. A cardinal rule in legal ethics is that lawyers do not represent opposing parties or get involved in matters where there is an appearance of a conflict of interest. To avoid such conflicts, lawyers routinely run conflicts checks. The January 13, 2003 letter included the names of four persons who were likely to interact with the Respondent during the visit. A simple computer check of Supreme Court filings would have revealed that Rickey Calhoun and Andre Brigham Young had cases pending before the Supreme Court. By not doing so, Respondent created a situation where it was likely he would interact with these individuals.

The Respondent raised the subject of "volitional control" with some of the residents during the tour. He introduced the topic at a time when the Justices were circulating draft opinions in Thorell, a case dealing with the "volitional control" issue. The subtle distinctions offered by the Respondent as a defense to his actions do not cure this lapse of judgment. It is reasonable that lawyers handling appeals that involve "volitional control" issues would have concerns about the Respondent's objectivity and impartiality based on this conduct.

The Respondent met with Charles Johnson, a litigant in the Thorell case. In re Thorell had been pending before the Court for several months. This was an appeal involving confinement issues for sexual predators. The Respondent was visiting an institution that confined convicted sexual predators. He should

have realized that it was likely that he might interact with a litigant in that case, especially if he was going to inquire about "volitional control." At a minimum, the Respondent, upon his arrival at the Center, should have inquired if the Superintendent or anyone on his staff had taken any action regarding his request that the residents be instructed about the limitations of the visit.

On two occasions during the visit, the Respondent accepted unknown material from two different residents. While he was testifying, the Respondent made a point of referring to SCC residents as "prisoners" and that he views the SCC as a prison. (Transcript p. 915) It is elementary that a visitor to a correctional facility should not accept packages or other material from an inmate. Even assuming such materials were involuntarily thrust upon him, the Respondent should have immediately turned the documents over to the people responsible for running the institution. Instead, he took them to Olympia and filed them away in his office. Upon returning to Olympia, the Respondent made no initial effort to cure any of his mistakes. He took no further action until he learned that counsel in *Thorell* became aware of his conduct during the visit. On March 18, 2003, a Motion for Recusal was filed. A few days later on April 8, 2003, the Respondent was provided with the names of the residents with whom he interacted. Even with this notification of concern, the Respondent did not run a computer check of the names on the list to ascertain if there might be a problem.

The actions of the Respondent that are cited in the examples above violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically, this conduct violated Canon 1 by failing to enforce high standards of judicial conduct and also violated Canon 2(A) by failing to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Respondent takes the position that judges should visit correctional institutions and that he should not be disciplined because he took advantage of the opportunity to have an educational experience. He further offers as a defense the certification from the Mandatory Continuing Judicial Education Committee as proof he did nothing inappropriate.

This proceeding is not about whether judges should visit correctional institutions. The Commission strongly encourages judges to visit correctional institutions. Normally such undertakings are tours sponsored by judicial education organizations that make arrangements with the authorities at the institution. If a tour is sponsored or originated by prisoners, prison rights advocates or other non-judicial groups, judges must be cognizant that they have a responsibility to exercise reasonable judgment in such an activity and anticipate potential conflicts and notify counsel when appropriate.

On any institutional visit (other than a court inspection pursuant to a specific case over which the judge is presiding), a reasonable judge:

- considers the likelihood that during such a tour, the judge will come into contact with inmates who presently have or are likely to have a matter pending before the judge. If such a likelihood exists, the judge establishes clear parameters of an institutional visit beforehand and notifies counsel when appropriate;
- avoids legal discussions with or accepting documents from inmates concerning legal matters while on a tour; and
- undertakes special efforts to notify the authorities and counsel if inadvertent interaction occurs between the judge and an inmate.

The Respondent's failure to exercise good judgment resulted in the ethical violations cited above. By not heeding the warnings of others and by not taking precautionary steps to ascertain if problems existed, the Respondent created legitimate concerns from counsel involved in certain cases before the Court. The Respondent's testimony sums up his state of mind:

Well, I believed that the prisoners at this facility would welcome a visit from a state Supreme Court justice to their facility or the Court to their facility. I didn't have any reason to believe that the staff would feel otherwise about it. Beyond that, I didn't—you know, I wasn't thinking about how everybody else in the world would think about it. (Transcript p.1004).

Finally, the Respondent claims that the complaints giving rise to this proceeding were brought by prosecutors who disagree with his judicial philosophy. He contends the complaints are politically motivated and therefore without merit. This argument is unfounded. The Statement of Charges in this proceeding was filed only after a thorough and independent investigation which included consideration of the Respondent's answers to the complaints.

FACTORS

Under both the Rules of the Commission and case law, there are ten non-exclusive factors the Commission must consider in determining the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct:

1. Whether the conduct was an isolated event or a part of a pattern of conduct.

The violations are all related to one event. The record reveals no pattern of conduct.

2. The nature, extent and frequency of the occurrence of the acts of misconduct.

Although this was an isolated event, as noted above, there were several acts which gave rise to the violations.

3. Whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom.

The misconduct did not take place in a courtroom; however some of the lapses occurred in the Justice's chambers.

- 4. Whether the misconduct occurred in the Justice's official capacity or his private life.
- All of the misconduct took place in the Justice's official capacity.
 - 5. Whether the Justice has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred.

The Justice does not acknowledge or recognize that his actions were inappropriate. Even though he was warned by other Supreme Court justices and has recused himself from a significant Supreme Court case, he remains insensitive to the perceptions of others in the legal community and the general public. His position is that he knows when he is influenced by something and only then does it matter. He also attempts to divert the blame for his conduct by contending that he is a political victim of lawyers who do not share his judicial philosophy. The Respondent's testimony is revealing in that regard. During his testimony, the Respondent was asked if he was concerned with how lawyers perceive his conduct:

- Q. Are you concerned with how lawyers see your actions as the--
- A. I am concerned with the activities of certain lawyers. I don't think that lawyers have any misconception about what this tour was about and how the tour was conducted. I don't think that any lawyer, any lawyer, who has testified here or hasn't testified here, ever thought for a second that anything I did on any of these that anything I did or heard or saw during the course of this tour would ever influence my decision on any case that came before me, not Mr. Hackett, not Mr. Bowers, not Mr. Norm Maleng, not any of them.
- Q. And that's really the issue for you, isn't it?
- A. It's the issue for them. (Transcript p. 1052).

A follow up question from another Commissioner:

- Q. Now, I'd like to read a sentence from the preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct. It says, "Intrinsic to all sections of this code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system." Now how do you reconcile what you said, that it's not an issue for you on these perceptions, but it's an issue for them, and how do you reconcile that with what's stated in the preamble of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
- A. Well, this requires a little further explanation. An issue for me would be prejudging a case, an issue for me would be engaging in activity contrary to the code or otherwise which would lead to a legitimate perception that I was less than impartial and that I could not be trusted as a judge to perform my duties impartially. I do not believe that the people that are complaining about this visit had any effect whatsoever on my views about how to adjudicate these cases. I think their agenda is a completely different one. (Transcript p. 1080)

Other testimony in response to a question from a Commissioner at the end of the proceeding:

- Q. Thank you. One last question from me. I know that you have read the canons before the proceeding. Do you today believe that you have an affirmative duty to avoid the perception of impropriety as a Supreme Court justice, sir?
- A. Yes, but then again, what is the perception of impropriety and what is the basis for that perception? I would hope that the perception would be based upon a full knowledge of the facts and the law, because there's a lot of people out there in society that think things are improper because they really don't understand what it's all about, and there's different points of view, so I just try to do the best I can. (Transcript p. 1068)
- 6. Whether the Justice has evidenced an effort to change or modify his conduct.

As noted in 5 above, the Respondent does not recognize any problems with his conduct, thus it is unknown if the Respondent would repeat similar conduct in the future.

7. The Justice's length of service on the bench.

The Respondent has been a Supreme Court Justice since January 1996.

8. Whether there have been prior complaints against the Justice.

There have been no prior sustained complaints against the Respondent.

9. The effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary.

With the exception of the Respondent's former law clerk, all of the lawyers who testified expressed concern about the Respondent's conduct. It is further evidenced by recusal motions filed against the Respondent by Snohomish County prosecutors. A state Supreme Court Justice is expected to be a model citizen. The expectations of lawyers are similar, especially those who practice before the Court, i.e., justices of the Supreme Court should be model jurists. The actions of the Respondent and his refusal to acknowledge the perceptions of others in the legal community reflect poorly on the Supreme Court and the judiciary in general.

10. The extent to which the Justice exploited his position to satisfy personal desires.

There is no evidence in the record to show that the Respondent exploited his position for personal desires.

SANCTION

Considering all of the factors above, the Commission must determine an appropriate sanction. The Commission concludes that admonishment is appropriate for this first violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, consistent with RCW 4.12.040, the Respondent is encouraged to exercise utmost caution in

1	considering his involvement in matters concerning the issue of volitional control presented by sexual predators		
2	residing at the Special Commitment Center.		
3	Dated as of the 27th day of May, 2005.		
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7	Betsyl. Wilkerson / Lelkenson	Josephine Townsend	
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10	Hagold D. Clarke, III	Wanda L. Briggs Wanda L. Briggs	
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12	Quairen E. Journe	Marianne Commely	
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CORRECTED AMENDED COMMISSION DECISION - 13